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Resumen
Para enriquecer los mecanismos de transmisión en la macroeconomía, se han incorporado las
fricciones financieras. Sin embargo, las predicciones de los modelos de ciclos económicos reales con
financiamiento externo costoso implican que la tasa de morosidad, el premio por riesgo y el precio
relativo del capital son procíclicos, lo que aparece como contradictorio con los datos. En este trabajo
se incluyen las fluctuaciones tecnológicas que afectan la productividad promedio y el riesgo
idiosincrásico de los productores de capital en un modelo estándar de financiamiento externo costoso.
Estos elementos permiten que en el modelo la tasa de morosidad, el premio por riesgo y el precio
relativo del capital sean contracíclicos. Esto es más coherente con los datos y es contrario al resultado
que se obtiene cuando sólo priman fluctuaciones de productividad neutrales al sector de la economía.
Intuitivamente, si los proyectos de inversión de los empresarios- productores de capital llegan a ser
más productivos en promedio, el precio relativo del capital y la tasa de morosidad caen, mientras que
la inversión y el producto aumentan. Usando datos sobre el precio relativo del capital, este trabajo
realiza una calibración de este tipo de fluctuaciones lo cual resalta su relevancia para los ciclos
económicos.
Abstract
Financial frictions have been used to enrich mechanism transmission in macroeconomics. However,
the predictions of real business cycle models of costly external finance imply a procyclical default
rate, external premium and relative price of capital which seems at odd with the data. In this article, we
include technology shocks that affect the average productivity and idiosyncratic risk of capital
producers in a standard costly external finance model. These elements enhance the model to deliver a
countercyclical default rate, external finance and relative price of capital premium which is more
consistent with the data and contrary to the result obtained with a sector neutral productivity shock.
Intuitively, if the entrepreneurs' investment projects become more productive in average, the relative
price of capital and the default rate fall while the investment and output increase. Using data on the
relative price of capital, we perform a calibration of this type of shocks which highlights its business
cycle relevance.
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The presence of ¯nancial frictions have been used as a key element to improve the quan-
titative performance of economic models. In macroeconomics, the existence of ¯nancial
markets imperfections have enhanced the transmission mechanisms in business cycle
models helping to replicate the empirical responses of aggregate variable to the shocks
of the economy.1 In ¯nance, incompleteness in the ¯nancial markets has resulted in a
higher equity premium which is more in line with the level observed in the data.2
In this article, we analyze quantitatively some asset pricing properties of a real busi-
ness cycle model with costly external ¯nance. There are several reasons to focus on a
costly external ¯nance model. First, this type of ¯nancial friction in a standard dynamic
macroeconomic model o®ers a rationale for the ampli¯cations and persistence of shocks
observed in the macroeconomic aggregate variables. Second, models of this nature are
consistent with the corporate ¯nance literature which has justi¯ed the imperfect substi-
tution between internal and external funds.3 Moreover, this gap of cost for the external
funds over the internal funds has generated empirical research testing if cash °ow, lever-
age and other balance-sheet factors have e®ects on the investment decisions of ¯rms
beyond their implicit information about investment opportunities.4 The result of this
empirical literature has been to argue that ¯nancial frictions are important in the in-
vestment decisions. Third, the basic costly external ¯nance can be justi¯ed through the
\costly state veri¯cation" problem ¯rst analyzed by Townsend (1979). The advantages
of this model are its simplicity and descriptive realism which allow it to be embedded
1Some prominent examples of this propagation features are Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke
et al. (1996, 1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
2For instance, Mankiw (1986), Constantinides and Du±e (1996) and Lustig (2001) use incomplete-
ness in the ¯nancial markets to obtain a high equity premium in line with the postwar data.
3Examples where the asymmetric information has been the main reason for this imperfect substitu-
tion are Gale and Hellwig (1985), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf (1984).
4In the empirical research about investment and ¯nancial constraints we can ¯nd examples of this
idea in Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hoshi et al. (1991).
1inside of a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
Hence, if the reason to explain the ampli¯cation and propagation mechanism at the
aggregate is associated with costly external ¯nance it seems natural to see whether the
assets pricing °uctuations in this kind of model are quantitatively appealing. Gomes et
al. (2003a) have argued that using a costly external ¯nance model can give a higher
mean and volatility of the equity premium than other standard real business cycle mod-
els. However, their results show that the size of the equity premium is still very low
compared with the data and the propagation mechanism is driven by a procyclical de-
fault rate and external premium which is a property that seems at odd with the data.
They argue that these ¯ndings cast doubt on the presence of ¯nancial frictions as a
realistic channel for the propagation mechanism in macroeconomics models.
In this article, we show that the inclusion of changes in the average productivity and
idiosyncratic risk of capital producers in the basic model of costly external ¯nance (see
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)) can give a source of countercyclical default rate and exter-
nal premium which is consistent with the data. The intuition of this result is as follows.
For instance, when the capital producers become more productive in average the supply
of new capital expands driving down the equilibrium price of capital, the default rate and
the external premium. At the same time, investment and consequently output expand.
A similar e®ect has a reduction in the dispersion of the productivity of capital producers.
Using US data on the relative price of capital we calibrate the stochastic process of
the aggregate and capital speci¯c productivity change. This calibration con¯rms the
importance of the capital speci¯c technological change in this costly external ¯nance
model. On one hand, these types of °uctuations are required to move the supply of
investment goods as a way to obtain a countercyclical relative price of capital. On the
other hand, if the aggregate productivity °uctuations are eliminated, the capital speci¯c
2productivity °uctuations can explain about 30% of the volatility in the US total output.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model with
emphasis on the ¯nancial contract between entrepreneurs and ¯nancial intermediaries.
After a base parameterization of the model in section 3, we analyze the response of the
economy to di®erent sources of °uctuations in section 4. In section 5, we make the ¯nal
calibration of the capital speci¯c technological change using some dynamic properties
of the relative price of capital in US. The ¯nal section 6 concludes and describes direc-
tions for future research. Appendix A derives some functions related with the ¯nancial
contract while appendix B describes the log-linearized system of equations used to solve
and simulate the model.
2 Model
The model presented in this section is based on Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The
framework is a standard neoclassical model with a costly external ¯nance driven by
endogenous agency costs. This element introduces ¯nancing constraints that contribute
to distort the optimal capital accumulation and thus generate a model with a much
richer set of dynamics. The economy consists of continuum of consumers of unit mass.
A fraction (1¡´) are households and fraction ´ are entrepreneurs. The latter consumers
produce capital goods and use external funds to ¯nance this activity. There are a set
of competitive ¯nancial intermediaries that provide funds to the entrepreneurial sector.
Finally, there are competitive ¯nal goods producers that do not face any ¯nancing
constraint. We can now examine in detail each of these agents.
32.1 Households






where E0[¢] denotes the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information,
¯ 2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor, ct and lt are the consumption and fraction of
the time that households work at t, respectively. In each period the household derives
income from renting the labor services and capital holdings at a competitive rates, wt
and rt, respectively. Also, they can sell the undepreciated capital. This income is used








t+1, qt and ± are the household capital holding for the next period, relative
price of capital and the depreciation rate, respectively. The optimal choices of household
can be summarized in the following ¯rst order conditions:
u1(ct;1 ¡ lt)wt = u2(ct;1 ¡ lt)
qtu1(ct;1 ¡ lt) = ¯Et[u1(ct+1;1 ¡ lt+1)(rt+1 + qt+1(1 ¡ ±))]
The ¯rst equation is the household labor supply. The second one is the Euler equation
that governs the household intertemporal substitution using capital holding to move
resources across periods.
42.2 Entrepreneurs









The entrepreneurs are di®erent to the household in two dimensions. They are risk
neutral and more impatient than households (° < 1). Risk neutrality implies that they
only care about expected returns which in turn will ensure that they will bear all risk.
That simpli¯es the ¯nancial contract explained below considerably. The extra discount
factor prevents that they are wealthy enough to overcome the ¯nancing constraint in
equilibrium. At the beginning of each period they have a net worth given by renting labor
and capital to the ¯nal good producers at competitive rates, we
t and rt, respectively.5








t is the capital holdings of the entrepreneur at the beginning of the period.
Within the period each entrepreneur can earn additional income by investing it units
of consumption goods in a technology that produces µtit of capital goods at the end
of the period. It is assumed that µt is a random variable independent and identically
distributed across entrepreneurs, but not over time with cumulative distribution and
probability density functions Ft(µt) = F(µt;¸t) and ft(µt) = f(µt;¸t), respectively. ¸t
is a vector of parameters that de¯nes the distribution of µt. Following the costly state
veri¯cation literature, it is considered that µt is observed only by the entrepreneur at
the end of the period. It can be observed by outsiders at a cost of ¹it units of capital
goods. In the beginning of the period entrepreneurs and outsiders know the distribution
5Since leisure does not enter in the entrepreneur preferences, they work all their available time.
5of µt but the entrepreneurs learn their types in the end of the period without any cost.
Investment is ¯nanced by borrowing funds from ¯nancial intermediaries if needed.
However, the asymmetric information about the productivity of the entrepreneur makes
the external ¯nance costly. Gale and Hellwig (1985) in a static setting show that the
optimal ¯nancial contract between a lender and an entrepreneurs resembles a risky debt.
Here to keep this type of contract is that is eliminated any repeated game aspects of
the ¯nancial contract assuming that the contract can be only based on the current level
of net worth and investment. Also, we assume that the ¯nancial markets are incom-
plete.So, they cannot write contracts that are functions of all public information.6
Let rl
t denote the lending rate of this risky debt in terms of capital goods. Therefore,
the contract at t states that if entrepreneurs borrows (it ¡ nt) he commits to repay
(1 + rl
t)(it ¡ nt) in terms of capital goods. However, if the realization of µt is too low
the entrepreneur will not able to repay and must default. In other words, this kind of
contract determines a cuto® ¹ µt such that:
² if µt < ¹ µt, the entrepreneur defaults, the lender monitors the project outcome. It
follows that the entrepreneur sets ce
t;ae
t+1 = 0
² if µt > ¹ µt, the entrepreneur repays (1+rl
t)(it¡nt) = ¹ µtit and his budget constraint
is qtae
t+1 + ce
t = qt(µtit ¡ (1 + rl
t)(it ¡ nt))
With this ¯nancial contract the euler equation for the entrepreneur can be expressed
as:
qt = ¯°Et[(rt+1 + qt+1(1 ¡ ±))R
n
t+1(nt+1;it+1)]
6In a partial equilibrium framework, Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2002) and Clementi and Hopen-
hayn (2002) characterize the full dynamic optimal contract between a ¯nancial constrained entrepreneur
and a lender when the ¯nancial frictions come from enforceability problems and asymmetric information,
respectively. The contracts are intertemporal optimal and based on all public information.
6where Rn
t (nt;it) is the expected return to the internal funds at the beginning of period
t in terms of consumption goods given a net worth of nt and an investment of it. Using






Et[(µtit ¡ (1 + r
l
t)(it ¡ nt))1fµt ¸ ¹ µtg] =
qtit
nt
Et[(µt ¡ ¹ µt)1fµt ¸ ¹ µtg]
where 1fµt ¸ ¹ µtg is the indicator function that is equal to 1 if µt ¸ ¹ µt and zero
otherwise.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries allocate household savings by ¯nancing entrepreneur invest-
ment project. By funding a large number of entrepreneurs, the intermediaries diversify
project speci¯c risk and, thus, guarantee a safe return to the households since there is
no aggregate risk during the life of the project.
Now we can get the expected income of intermediaries after ¯nancing a project of
size it with a loan of (it ¡ nt):
qtitg1t(¹ µt) = qt[
Z ¹ µt
0
µitft(µ)dµ ¡ ¹Ft(¹ µt)it + (1 ¡ Ft(¹ µt))(1 + r
l
t)(it ¡ nt)]
qtitg1(¹ µt;¸t) = qtit[
Z ¹ µt
0




µf(µ;¸t)dµ ¡ ¹F(¹ µt;¸t) + (1 ¡ Ft(¹ µt;¸t))¹ µt]
where g1 denotes the fraction of the expected net production of capital goods received
by the ¯nancial intermediary.
7Similarly, the expected income received by the entrepreneur is:
qtitg2t(¹ µt) = qt[
Z 1
¹ µt
µitft(µ)dµ ¡ (1 ¡ Ft(¹ µt))(1 + r
l
t)(it ¡ nt)]
qtitg2(¹ µt;¸t) = qtit[
Z 1
¹ µt




µf(µ;¸t)dµ ¡ (1 ¡ F(¹ µt;¸t))¹ µt]
where g2 denotes the fraction of the expected net production of capital goods received
by the entrepreneur.
We can check that g1(µt;¸t) + g2(µt;¸t) = Et[µt] ¡ ¹F(µt;¸t) so that an amount
¹F(µt;¸t) of the capital produced is lost due to monitoring cost.7





qtitg1(¹ µt;¸t) ¸ (it ¡ nt) (P1)
qtitg2(¹ µt;¸t) ¸ nt (P2)
where (P1) and (P2) are the participation constraint for ¯nancial intermediaries and
entrepreneurs, respectively.8 (P1) will be binding while (P2) will not be binding. This
conclusion comes from the fact that there are many competitive ¯nancial intermediaries
and hence they must break even at the optimal contract.
7In appendix A is described g1, g2, F and f for the case that µt has a log-normal distribution function
which is the case used in the calibration.
8Recall that the ¯nancial contract is within the period so that opportunity cost for the funds of
entrepreneurs and ¯nancial intermediaries is zero.




1 ¡ qtg1(¹ µt;¸t)




(¹ µt;¸t)](1 ¡ qtg1(¹ µt;¸t)) + qt[
@g1
@¹ µ
(¹ µt;¸t)]g2(¹ µt;¸t) = 0
Now using g1(¹ µt;¸t) + g2(¹ µt;¸t) = Et[µt] ¡ ¹F(¹ µt;¸t) we can rewrite the FOC as:
1 = qt[Et[µt] ¡ ¹F(¹ µt;¸t) + ¹f(¹ µt;¸t)
g2(¹ µt;¸t)
@g2
@¹ µ (¹ µt;¸t)
]
This equation de¯nes an implicit relationship among qt, ¹ µt and ¸t as ¹ µt = ¹ µ(qt;¸t).
From that last equation can be proved that @¹ µ
@qt > 0. Also, given our parameterization
of the distribution of µt, we can express Et[µt] as function m(¸t).
The external premium in terms of consumption good is qt(1 + rl
t) ¡ 1 which can be
expressed as ¹ µt=g1(¹ µt;¸t) ¡ 1. From here we can see that for a given ¸t the external
premium is increasing in ¹ µt.9 This is important since a procyclical external premium is
equivalent to have a procyclical probability of default if the distribution of µ is invariant
to the cyclical position of the economy. This is the case in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
However, if the distribution of µ changes with the cyclical position of the economy we do
not know how the external premium moves with the business cycles clearly. A critical
element in this model is going to be how the set of parameters of the distribution of µ
moves along the business cycles.
Other ¯nancial statistic that we can derive from this model is the default rate which
9From the de¯nition of g1(¹ µt;¸t) it can be derived that
@g1(¹ µt;¸t)
@¹ µt is negative which guarantees that
@¹ µt=g1(¹ µt;¸t)
@¹ µt > 0.
9is de¯ned by F(¹ µt;¸t). Using the de¯nition of g2(¢) we obtain:
Et
£









µf(µ;¸t)dµ ¡ (1 ¡ F(¹ µt;¸t))¹ µt
= g2(¹ µt;¸t)








1 ¡ qtg1(¹ µt;¸t)
where the second equality comes from using (P1) with equality.
Finally, using the fact (P1) is binding we can express the investment as a function
of the net worth, the cuto® and the vector of parameters of the distribution or as a




1 ¡ qtg1(¹ µt;¸t)
=
nt
1 ¡ qtg1(¹ µ(qt;¸t);¸t)
This equation can be interpreted as the supply of investment goods obtained from
this costly external ¯nance model. For ¯xed values for nt and ¸t, this investment supply
will in general be increasing in qt.
102.4 Final Goods Producers
The ¯nal set of agents are the ¯nal good producers. They are competitive ¯rms using




where Kt is the aggregate level of capital in the economy in period t, Ht is the
aggregate supply of household labor, He
t is the aggregate supply of entrepreneurial labor
and zt is the aggregate sector neutral productivity factor. The optimality conditions








The ¯rst expression de¯nes the rental rate of capital. The second one determines the
household labor demand while the last one speci¯es the entrepreneur labor demand.
2.5 Aggregation
By the law of large numbers, the aggregate investment at t is the expected value of the







¹itf(µ;¸t)dµ = it[m(¸t) ¡ ¹F(¹ µt;¸t)]









t(rt + qt(1 ¡ ±))
qtg2(¹ µt;¸t)
1 ¡ qtg1(¹ µt;¸t)
]
where Ae
t is the aggregate capital holding of entrepreneurs at the beginning of t and with
some abuse of notation ce
t is now the average entrepreneurial consumption. Finally, given
the linearity of the investment as function of the net worth and the mapping between







[rt + qt(1 ¡ ±)]
it =
nt
1 ¡ qtg1(¹ µt;¸t)
where now nt and it are the average entrepreneurial net worth and investment.
2.6 Equilibrium Conditions
A competitive equilibrium satis¯es the following markets clearing conditions:
Ht = (1 ¡ ´)lt
He
t = ´
(1 ¡ ´)ct + ´ce
t + ´it = Yt
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + ´it[m(¸t) ¡ F(¹ µt;¸t)¹]
A recursive competitive equilibrium is de¯ned by decision rules for Kt+1, Ae
t+1, Ht,
nt, it, ¹ µt, ce
t, ct, and pricing functions qt, wt, we
t, rt, where these decision rules and pricing
functions are invariant functions of (Kt;Ae
t;zt;¸t) and satisfy the following equations:
u1(ct;1 ¡ lt)wt = u2(ct;1 ¡ lt) (1)
12qtu1(ct;1 ¡ lt) = ¯Et[u1(ct+1;1 ¡ lt+1)(rt+1 + qt+1(1 ¡ ±))] (2)
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + ´it[m(¸t) ¡ F(¹ µt;¸t)¹] (3)
qt[m(¸t) ¡ ¹F(¹ µt;¸t) + ¹f(¹ µt;¸t)
g2(¹ µt;¸t)
@g2
@¹ µ (¹ µt;¸t)
] = 1 (4)
(1 ¡ ´)ct + ´c
e
























qt = ¯°Et[(rt+1 + qt+1(1 ¡ ±))
qt+1g2(¹ µt+1;¸t+1)
1 ¡ qt+1g1(¹ µt+1;¸t+1)
] (9)
Ht = (1 ¡ ´)lt (10)
rt = exp(zt)G1(Kt;Ht;´) (11)
wt = exp(zt)G2(Kt;Ht;´) (12)
13w
e
t = exp(zt)G3(Kt;Ht;´) (13)
3 Based Calibration
3.1 Preferences, Technologies and Financial Parameters
The base calibration is designed to make a simple comparison among the e®ects on the
economy of di®erent sources of °uctuations. We follow the lines of Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) in almost all parameters except for some ¯nancial statistics. We begin assuming
that the utility function of consumer is :
u(c;1 ¡ l) = ln(c) + º(1 ¡ l)
where º is chosen such that in steady state the households work 30% of their time and
¯ = 0:99. This is a standard preference used in the real business cycle literature to
explain quarterly US data.10









where ®1 = 0:36, ®2 = 0:6399. The share of the entrepreneurial labor is chosen so
small such that labor income plays a very irrelevant role both in determining net worth
and income distribution in this model. zt is the ¯nal good production technological
change. The stochastic process for this exogenous variable will be explained below.
Regarding the parameters that de¯nes the ¯nancial contract as in Carlstrom and
10See Hansen (1985).
14Fuerst (1997) we use a monitoring cost ¹ = 0:25. Also, the distribution of µt is assumed
to be log-normal. Then the set of parameters that de¯ne the distribution of µ in t are
mean mt and variance ¾2
t. The speci¯c stochastic process for these two variables will be
described in the next subsection. We assume as normalization that at the steady state
m = 1. Hence, to match the default rate and the external premium we just need to pin
down ¹ µ and ¾ at the steady state. Using a default premium of 203 basis points and a
default rate of 0.974% we can get ¹ µ = 0:1361, ¾ = 0:6590. These values imply a steady
state relative price of capital of q = 1:0861. Also, to avoid self-¯nancing outcomes for
the entrepreneurs, we should set ° such that °qg2(¹ µ;m;¾2)=(1¡qg1(¹ µ;m;¾2)) = 1. That
condition gives a ° = 0:9111. Finally, the depreciation rate ± is set in 2%.
3.2 Stochastic Process for Shocks

































































where we consider that "z;t, "m;t, and "¾;t have a joint normal distribution indepen-
dent and identically distributed over time. Also, the mean of these perturbations are
zero and are independent each other with variance denoted by À2
z, À2
m , and À2
¾, respec-
tively.
In the real business cycle literature when the ¯nal good technological change is the
only source of exogenous °uctuations is typically used ½z = 0:95 and Àz = 0:712%.
Unfortunately, we do not have unambiguous data to obtain values for other parameters
governing the joint stochastic process of these exogenous °uctuations. For example, be-
ing consistent with this model, data on the °uctuations of the relative price of capital or
15the default premium contain information of the three shocks considered here and there
are multiple ways to decompose the °uctuations of the endogenous variables as coming
from these shocks.
Since the parameters in the stochastic process of the exogenous variables will imply
a particular dynamic of the endogenous variables one method to get these parameters is
to choose them such that the model matches some moments of the endogenous variables
observed in the data. However, there is a large number of potential moments that can
be used and an equally large set of parameters to be calibrated (8 in the autoregressive
matrix and 2 variances). Hence, it seems important to understand the quantitative
dynamics in a simpler context of the stochastic process. On these lines, in the next
section we will analyze the impulse response functions in a constrained case which ¯xes
½ij = 0 for all i;j = z;m;¾ and i 6= j. In other words, there are no spillover e®ects
among exogenous °uctuations.
4 Impulse Responses for a Simple Case
After having the base calibration of the model we can make numerical analysis using the
well known method of taking a log-linear expansion of the equations of the model around
the deterministic steady state. Then the log-linear decision rules are computed using
the method of undetermined coe±cients. Having this we are ready to compute the im-
pulse response functions to the three source of °uctuations: (i) aggregate-sector-neutral
productivity changes (z); (ii) changes in the average productivity of capital producer
(m) and; (iii) changes in the idiosyncratic risk of the capital producer technology (¾2).
The impulse responses are computed with an initial shock that deviates each one of
the exogenous variables 1% from the steady state. Since we did not choose a particular
value for ½m and ½¾ we consider two cases: (a) ½m = ½¾ = 0:9; and (b) ½m = ½¾ = 0.
16The ¯rst case describes a highly persistent evolution of these exogenous variables and
the second considers a path that is independent over time.
4.1 Shock in the Aggregate Sector Neutral Productivity
The responses of the main economic variables to a aggregate productivity shock of 1%
are displayed in ¯gures 1 and 2. The results are equivalent to Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997). The output, investment and consumption exhibit a hump-shape pattern that
re°ects a delayed response to this shock that is not present in the standard neoclassical
model. The agency cost and the persistency of the aggregate productivity shock gen-
erate a higher autocorrelation in the output and investment growth. Output increases
slowly until to reach a positive deviation from its steady state of almost 1.8% at the
third quarter after the shock. Investment also displays the same path pro¯le that output
with a peak deviation of more than 5%. The relative price of capital increases a 0.8%
instantaneously to die out monotonically afterwards. The external premium and the
default rate increase about 25 and 15 basis points at the time of the shock having a path
similar to the one of the relative price of capital.
The intuition behind this result is related with the increase in the marginal cost
of investment due to the agency problem. An increase in the productivity of the ¯nal
goods producers shifts out the demand for new capital and entrepreneurs then want
to increase the production of capital goods. However, the increase in investment needs
external funds which is costly and the net worth of entrepreneurs does not raise too much
initially since they cannot adjust their capital holding until the next period. Hence,
the supply of investment does not shift out too much compared to the increase in the
demand of new capital which delivers a increase in the price of capital. This rise in
the price of capital drives up the cuto® ¹ µt and therefore it pushes up the default rate
and the external premium. Although we obtain a richer propagation dynamics of the
17aggregate productivity shock in this costly external ¯nance model, the impulse responses
characterize a procyclical default rate, external premium and relative price of capital.
4.2 Shock in the Average Entrepreneurial Productivity
Figures 3 and 4 depict the responses of the economy to an increase of 1% in the mean
of the entrepreneurial productivity when this shock is persistent (½m = 0:9). This can
be interpreted as an exogenous force that drives up the average productivity of entre-
preneurs in the production of capital goods. This change shifts out the supply curve of
investment goods without a®ecting simultaneously the demand for investment. Hence,
the investment and the equilibrium price of capital goes down which lowers the default
rate and external premium. Hence, we get a countercyclical relative price of capital,
default rate and external premium which is more consistent with the data.
It is worth noting that the biggest deviation in the premium and default rate is
observed around the second or third quarter after the initial shock in the average pro-
ductivity. In those periods the premium is 30 basis points below its steady state value
while the default rate displays almost 20 basis points of reduction with respect its steady
state value. This hump-shaped path of these two variables are not present under ag-
gregate sector productivity shock (see Figure 2). Although the magnitude in output
response is little lower after the shock in the average entrepreneurial productivity than
after the aggregate sector productivity shock, the response in the investment has the
same quantitative reach which coincides with a decrease in the external ¯nance premium.
The responses of the economy to this same shock but for the iid case (½m = 0) are
displayed in ¯gures 5 and 6. Although, the responses of the economic variables die out
very fast in this case, the result still shares the basic property of having a countercyclical
relative price of capital. That pattern is driven by a short period shift out of the supply
of investment which in turn implies a contraction of the the default rate and external
18premium.
4.3 Shock in the Variance of Entrepreneurial Productivity
Other source of °uctuation is a change in the variance of µt. This can be interpreted as a
change in the idiosyncratic risk of entrepreneurs. An increase in ¾2 implies a rise in the
idiosyncratic risk of entrepreneurs. The response of the main variables to an increase in
the idiosyncratic risk of entrepreneurs for the persistent case (½¾ = 0:9) are depicted in
¯gures 7 and 8.
An increase in the idiosyncratic risk of entrepreneurial productivity shift inward the
supply of investment driving up the price of capital and down the investment in the equi-
librium. The rise in the price of the capital pushes up the cuto® µt such that the default
rate and the external premium go up. Thus, we are back to the case of a countercyclical
relative price of capital, default rate and external premium. Given the persistence of
this shock, the e®ect stays for a bunch of period.
However, the quantitative results are not very signi¯cative under this type of shocks.
The output and investment fall only -0.025% and -0.15%, respectively. Moreover, the
hump-shaped of these two variables is not observed and only the entrepreneur net worth
displayed that feature but also with a low quantitative magnitude (0.045%). These fea-
tures ensure that this type of shock loses its attractiveness from a quantitative point of
view. Even though if we were to scale up the path in the impulse responses, we will need
an increase of 40% in the variance of the entrepreneurial productivity to get a reduction
of 1% in output which would imply a big increase of 800 and 450 basis points in the
premium and default rate, respectively.
When the shock to the idiosyncratic risk is iid we have the same pattern but as it is
19expected that this e®ect is short lived. This case is displayed in ¯gures 9 and 10 where
the magnitude is even smaller.
5 Calibration of the Stochastic Process
From the last section we noted that only the shocks to the aggregate sector productivity
and the average entrepreneurial productivity will have a relevant magnitude. Hence, in
this section we will focus on calibrating the stochastic process assuming the only pres-
ence of these two shocks.
Using the notation introduced earlier we will suppose that the aggregate sector pro-


























where ("z;t;"m;t)0 have independent and identical distribution over time with mean
















In this speci¯cation we have assumed that the spillover e®ects are symmetric: ½zm =
½mz. For simplicity we will keep the same parameters values known for the aggregate
sector productivity °uctuation, i.e., ½z = 0:95 and Àz = 0:712%. This implies that we
need to calibrate three parameters: ½m, ½zm, and Àm. Hence, we will require to match
three moments observed in the data to obtain these parameters.
20In Table 5 we displayed some moments computed quarterly from the US economy
during the period 1954:Q1 - 2004:Q1.11 The variables shown are total real GDP (Y),
real ¯xed investment (I), and the relative price of ¯xed investment de¯ned as investment
de°ator divided by the GDP de°ator. The statistics are computed using the log devia-
tion of each series with respect to their Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter.
Table 1: Standard Deviation and Autocorrelations with GDP
st. dev. x(-1) x(0) x(+1)
Y 1.00 0.85 1.00 0.85
I 3.01 0.79 0.90 0.84
q 0.44 -0.20 -0.10 0.03
From the table we can conclude that the relative price of capital is slightly counter-
cyclical and a reduction in the last quarter can predict an increase in total output in
the current one. Recalling the impulse responses graphed in the last section, we can see
that the aggregate sector productivity shock can not produce this negative correlation
with output. However, the presence of °uctuations to the average productivity of capital
goods producers can induce a negative correlation between output and relative price of
capital.
Also, since in this model the cyclical properties of the default premium resembles
that of the relative price of capital, this result will imply a countercyclical default pre-
mium. This last property has been well documented in ¯nance (see for example Gomes
et al. (2003b)), but since this model contains a highly simpli¯ed corporate sector, it
is harder to see what premium in the data is actually described by this model. Hence,
we prefer to focus on the relative price of capital as the variable containing informa-
11The standard deviation are expressed relative to the GDP standard deviation which is 1.6%.
21tion regarding the shift in the supply and demand for investment good which in turn
will convey something about the default rate and external ¯nance premium in this model.
Finally, we consider the following moments from the data to be matched with this
model: (i) the standard deviation of the relative price of capital with respect to the one
of the GDP (0.44) ; (ii) the contemporaneous correlation between GDP and the relative
price of capital (-0.10) and; (iii) the correlation of the GDP with one lag of the relative
price of capital (-0.20). These values imply ½m = 0:81, ½zm = 0:12 and Àm = 0:38%.
This ¯nal calibration highlights the relevance of the capital speci¯c technological
change to explain business cycle and at the same time gets plausible cyclical properties
for the default rate and external premium in a model with ¯nancing constraints. If we
shut down the aggregate sector productivity shocks we can get an estimate of the relative
importance of the capital speci¯c technological change in terms of the output volatility.
This estimation concludes that a 30% of the °uctuations in GDP could be attributed
to a capital speci¯c technological change. Surprisingly, Greenwood et al. (2000) obtain
the same result for the contribution of the capital speci¯c technological change using a
di®erent model and methodology.
6 Final Thoughts
Financial frictions have been used to explain persistence in macroeconomics and asset
pricing anomalies. Also, the empirical research on the determinants of the aggregate
demand has given a important role to the credit markets imperfections.
In this article, we analyze simultaneously the quantitative implications of ¯nancial
frictions on macroeconomics and their implications on the behavior of the default rate,
the external ¯nance premium and the relative price of capital. We extend a costly exter-
22nal ¯nance model to allow for more plausible cyclical properties of default rate, external
premium and relative price of capital.
The basic ingredient is the inclusion of changes in the average entrepreneurial pro-
ductivity or idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk. These elements deliver a countercyclical
pattern for the default rate, external premium and relative price of capital which is more
consistent with the data. This is a very simple case that makes the supply of invest-
ment goods shift more than the demand for investment which implies a reduction in
the relative price of capital when investment rises. The increasing relationship between
the price of capital and the default rate in the model gives a source to reconcile the
default rate behavior along the cyclical position of the economy. In other words, in good
times when investment and output go up, the default rate, external ¯nance premium
and relative price of capital fall.
The result of countercyclical relative price of capital is very important since the US
postwar aggregate °uctuations show this feature. Greenwood et al. (2000) show that
investment-speci¯c technology shocks can explain that behavior of the relative price of
capital and about the 30% of output °uctuations. This article obtains the same quanti-
tative result and o®ers another dimension for their observations because the shocks that
induce a countercyclical price of capital are speci¯c to the capital producers. In other
words, the modi¯cation to the costly external ¯nance model suggested here shows an
another way to rationalize the sectoral speci¯c technological changes as an important
source of economic °uctuations and be consistent with the countercyclical features of
the relative price of capital. It is also worth noting that this cyclical behavior of these
variables is obtained without a®ecting the propagation mechanism emphasized by the
costly external ¯nance model.
It is worth stating several directions for future research. First, the modi¯cations to
23the basic model of costly external ¯nance were done with the purpose of getting the
right directions for the cyclical behavior of the default rate. It is still the case that
the technological change in the capital production are not completely understood from
a economic point of view. For that reason is interesting to investigate other ways to
induce a shift in the supply of investment that comes from the economic environment
and not just from new exogenous state variables.
Second, this model does not o®er a complete theoretical counterpart for asset pricing.
In particular, it is hard how to interpret what can be called equity in this model. Gomes
et al. (2003a) use the return of household capital holding as equity, but that de¯nition
is not very satisfactory. Hence, other extension would be how to introduce clearly the
presence of two sources of ¯nancing: risky debt and equity in the model.
Third, having de¯ned clearly equity in the model, it is straightforward ask whether
the costly external ¯nance model gives sensitive results in other dimension of the asset
pricing. For example, it is interesting to ¯nd out what other elements should be added
to have a high equity premium.
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267 Appendix A: Distribution of µ and Financial Con-
tract Functions
As described in the article, we assume that µ follows a log-normal distribution function.
In this case the set of parameters that determine the distribution can be reduced to the
mean (mt) and variance (¾2
t) of µt. Let ©(¢) and Á(¢) denote the cumulative and density
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278 Appendix B: Log-linearized Equations
This appendix lists the set of equations that characterizes the equilibrium and their
log-linearized versions used to solve and simulate the model. The variables without a
subscript t are the steady state values and the symbol `e' denotes the log deviation of
the variable with respect its steady state value.
Household-leisure decision
wt=ct = º
~ wt ¡ ¾~ ct = 0 (1)
Household-Euler Equation
qt=ct = ¯Etf(qt+1(1 ¡ ±) + rk
t+1)=ct+1g
Etf¯q(1 ¡ ±)~ qt+1 + ¯rk~ rk
t+1 ¡ q~ ct+1 ¡ q~ qt+1 + q~ ctg = 0 (2)
Aggregate Capital Evolution
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + ´it[mt ¡ F(¹ µt;mt;¾2
t)¹]
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@¹ µ (¹ µ;m;¾2)¹¹ µe ¹ µt ¡ K ~ Kt+1 = 0 (3)
Aggregate Expenditure
(1 ¡ ´)ct + ´ce
t + ´it = Yt
(1 ¡ ´)c~ ct + ´ce~ ce
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¹ µe ¹ µt = 0 (5)
Investment Supply
it(1 ¡ qtg1t(¹ µt;mt;st)) = nt
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t(qt(1 ¡ ±) + rk
t )=´
we ~ we
t + Aeq(1 ¡ ±)=´~ qt + Aerk=´~ rk
t + Ae(q(1 ¡ ±) + rk)=´ e Ae
t ¡ n~ nt = 0 (7)
Entrepreneurs Capital Holding
At+1 = ´g2t(¹ µt;mt;st)
nt
















@¾ (¹ µ;m;¾2)¾2 e ¾2
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t + ´ce=q~ qt ¡ Ae e Ae
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Entrepreneurs Euler Equation



























































zt + ®1 ~ Kt + ®2 ~ Ht ¡ ~ Yt = 0 (10)
Rental rate of Capital
rk





zt + ®2 ~ Ht ¡ (1 ¡ ®1) ~ Kt ¡ ~ rk
t = 0 (11)
30Household wage





zt + ®1 ~ Kt ¡ (1 ¡ ®2) ~ Ht ¡ ~ wt = 0 (12)
Entrepreneurs wage
zt + we





zt + ®1 ~ Kt + ®2 ~ Ht ¡ ~ we
t = 0 (13)


























































































































































Figure 1: Responses to a shock in the Aggregate Sector Productivity (Part 1)














































































































































































Figure 2: Responses to a shock in the Aggregate Sector Productivity (Part 2)
























































































































































Figure 3: Responses to a shock in the Average Entrepreneurial Productivity (½m = 0:9,
Part 1)













































































































































































Figure 4: Responses to a shock in the Average Entrepreneurial Productivity (½m = 0:9,
Part 2)






















































































































































Figure 5: Responses to a shock in the Average Entrepreneurial Productivity(½m = 0,
Part 1)








































































































































































Figure 6: Responses to a shock in the Average Entrepreneurial Productivity (½m = 0,
Part 2)



















































































































































Figure 7: Responses to a shock in the Variance of Entrepreneurial Productivity (½¾ =
0:9, Part 1)












































































































































































Figure 8: Responses to a shock in the Variance of Entrepreneurial Productivity (½¾ =
0:9, Part 2)






















































































































































Figure 9: Responses to a shock in the Variance of Entrepreneurial Productivity (½¾ = 0,
Part 1)












































































































































































Figure 10: Responses to a shock in the Variance of Entrepreneurial Productivity (½¾ = 0,
Part 2)
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